NATO General Adrian Bradshaw: Syria crisis is extremely complex

NATO General Adrian Bradshaw: Syria crisis is extremely complex
  • By defencematters

NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Adrian Bradshaw stated that the Syria crisis is extremely complex, it’s not susceptible to easy solutions otherwise NATO would have found them.

Edgars Skvariks

 

NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Adrian Bradshaw in an interview for “Defense Matters” stated that the Syria crisis is extremely complex, it's not susceptible to easy solutions otherwise NATO would have found them. Speaking on a possible new arms race, he stressed that if Russia seeks to achieve significant changes in capabilities, NATO will have to address any changes their own way. “I would hate to see the emergence to a new arms race at this time when there are other demands on our economies,” he said, adding that NATO will continue to sustain armed forces in proportion to threats that it faces.

 

Regarding the refugee crises, some Latvian officials have stated that some NATO countries could refuse to be a part of Baltic airspace missions because of Latvian reluctance to accept refugees. Is it possible that such situation could arise or is this just rhetoric?

I don't see any suggestions of that from within NATO. I am quite confident that we will resource the air-policing mission. Everybody appreciates the importance of sustaining that mission, regardless of how we progress and how we are dealing with the refugee crisis, which is rather a different issue. I see no sign that we will be in short of air policing.

 

So there are no links with NATO's Article 5, it is still set in stone?

I am amazed that anybody should think otherwise. There's absolutely no suggestion that the current refugee crisis would have any affect in NATO's approach to Article 5. I mean, it's just unthinkable.

 

What about solidarity?

Well, nations agree and disagree overall on all sorts of political issues, but the issue of security stands over on all of those, of highest importance. There is absolutely no suggestion that nations would inhibit our ability to deliver the collective security because of disagreement or differences of opinion, overall our approach to refugees or any number of pressing political problems - economic, political, social, or whatever.

 

So we have nothing to fear?

There's no threat to Article 5. We are rock solid behind Article 5.

 

Maybe there are some ways how NATO and its allies could participate and solve the refugee crisis?

Ultimately the solution to this larger crisis requires a holistic strategic approach that involves using all the arms of states and international power and influence, one of those is the military instrument. Where stability is precarious there might be a role in stabilization, in capacity building and training. Or even in imposing or assisting the areas that are currently unstable in the delivery of stability. That requires political consensus. It's quite within the capabilities of NATO to do so, as proved in the delivery of huge stabilization in a decade or so in Afghanistan. So it’s within our capabilities, there are of course potential roles for NATO, but it’s all about political willingness.

 

You have spent a considerable time in Afghanistan. From your experience, why are we facing this crisis now? Has the coalition made some of the mistakes, if any?

Anybody is aware that in the aftermath of the many NATO nations and other nations involvement in Iraq, and following a long and demanding operation in Afghanistan, the political appetite for engagement in demanding costly, risky stabilization operations is a little more limited at the moment. When the Syria crisis blew up, you add to that reluctance to become embroiled in this kind of thing. The Syria crisis is extremely complex, it's not susceptible to easy solutions or we would have found them. The existence of that huge cauldron of instability on the borders of Iraq, which was a nation that was in the early stages of attempting to stabilize itself, following the big international operation in that country. I'm afraid that one has destabilized the other. The instability has infected Iraq again. The root cause of that this time around was in Syria. Of course there were factors within Iraq that contributed strongly, but Syria remains a very serious problem for the international community.

 

Do you see any mistakes that have been made there?

In Iraq and Afghanistan? In every military operation there are lessons to be learned, there are things that could be done better, there are things that went right, there are things that went not so well. We are still in the process of examining that, both the nations involved and collectively. So I'm not going to discuss the rights and wrongs of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan here. As I said, I see the Daesh problem in Syria and Iraq as having emerged principally from the situation in Syria, which was a new international problem, that still requires a resolution.

 

How do you see Russia's involvement in Syria?

I think it's in early days but there is obviously a considerable concern about what their objectives might be in Syria. I think we need to wait and see how it develops.

 

Do we really just need to sit and wait to see how the situation develops?

I'm not saying that we should sit and wait. I'm saying that we should look very carefully of what their objectives might be, and we should discuss it with the regional nations and those within the interests in that area. We should develop our responses accordingly.

 

Does NATO have any plans for permanent bases or using the city of Liepāja?

If the question is - does NATO intend to straighten the security of the Baltic region? The answer is - absolutely. In that NATO is refining its plans at the moment for deterrence and defense. That is a huge step forward in the ability of NATO to deliver effective defense and deterrence in the region. Through the refinement of our plans we will enhance our capabilities in the region. That does not necessarily mean we will move a huge amount of hardware, but it might involve some movements. What it does mean is that our understanding how we would respond to different circumstances is being refined and that itself is a step changing capability.

 

Any plans for Liepāja?

I couldn't comment on an individual aspect of that plan. It is too early to tell exactly where we would see changes occurring. We already created some significant points of NATO presence in Latvia and in the other Baltic states, and the eastern lines of the Alliance. With the creation of our NATO force integration units, which are NATO points of international presence, and of course the international presence from NATO nations is constant. I mean today we have 20 or so nations from NATO on Latvian soil and in any month of the year you would see several nations exercising here. The NATO presence frankly is constant anyway.

 

Sometimes we hear that the Baltic region is hard to defend. Can NATO successfully defend the region in case of a military attack?

We are confident that we can formulate and refine very effective defense plans for this and other regions. The resources available to NATO are huge, however they are proportional to the size of the Alliance and the task we face in collective defense. So, yes, it is possible to formulate defense plans. What I would say is that in formulating defense plans one is not always relying on symmetry, this is not always about matching one force with an exact mirroring force.

 

There have also been talks that tanks could get stuck in the Baltic swamps, A European standard railway to the Russian border is also missing. Can NATO effectively move its forces to any region in the Baltic states?

All of these issues are affecting the aggressor and the defender. Defender seeks to make an advantage of these things. I would say that anything that inhibits armored access is a positive advantage, wouldn't you?

 

But still, does NATO have equipment and time to move to the Russian border if needed?

I'm not going to talk about tactical details, clearly, but we have lots of highly professional commanders and leaders who are well into details in defending all sorts of terrain. We have within the NATO inventory perfectly adequate suite of equipment. Its very worrisome to see the degree to which Russia is expanding their military inventory and one has to question why would that be. But for NATO what we have is what we need and what we are doing right now is refining the plans to ensure that what is required is in the right spot and the right time.

 

Is the Russian military really becoming more advanced professionally or could it be called a show-off?

There's a huge investment of money into Russian armed forces and money does deliver extra capability. We hear every month or so another new proposed acquisition by the Russian forces. And as I said, one has to ask  what's all that for, because NATO is quite obviously a defensive alliance. You only have to see the mechanisms involved in NATO decision-making to understand that it couldn't possibly be an aggressive alliance. We hold armed forced in proportion to the task of collective defense and no more. We question why neighbors of NATO should seek to do any different.

 

Is there a possibility of a new arms race?

Clearly, if Russia seeks to achieve significant steps in changes of capability we will have to address any of these in our own way. I would hate to see the emergence of a new arms race at this time when there are other demands on our economies. But I am quite confident that NATO will continue to sustain armed forces in proportion to threats that it faces.

 

Is Latvia doing enough as it is, so to speak, a front-line country?

I would like to say that Latvia is doing a lot, you have just recently made a decision to step up the defense spending quite significantly with the view to bring it up to 2% of GDP, which is NATO’s aspiration. You are constantly hosting allied exercises and making excellent facilities available for the forces of NATO to come and conduct exercises here. Latvia is absolutely doing its part for the collective effort.

 

What are your predictions on the current situation in Ukraine?

Right now it looks as if Ukraine seems to be settling down to into some kind of frozen conflict. We will wait and see. Russians seem opportunistic in their approach to Ukraine therefore one cannot guarantee that the situation might not change. I am sure we will see twists and turns in the situation over the coming months but for now any reduction in fighting is welcome.

 

Do you see any movement from the Russian side into Ukraine now, vehicles and tanks?

Well, we have been open about this for months and months.

 

But for now, for this period.

Right now I would like to comment on precise movements. I think the important issue is the fact that over previous months Russia has without doubt been feeding equipment and heavy weaponry, battle tanks into Ukraine, which is completely contrary to international law. That's the thing we should remember. What's happening today frankly is not so important as the principle that in general over previous months this has been happening. That is an issue for the international community. Whether they are moving today or not, the fact is that it has been happening.

 

What are the current threats that NATO is facing now?

Clearly the willingness of neighbors to transgress international boundaries and seize territories by force is of considerable concern to NATO and indicates a potential threat which we must take fully into account. There is a presence of Daesh in the margins of NATO and there are numerous sources of instability across North Africa and the Middle East and down into the Sahel of course. All of those are of great concern to NATO and the readiness action plan that was agreed in Wales in last autumn seeks to address all of those issues by increasing the readiness and responsiveness of the NATO reaction forces.